Categories, Controls and Ceilings by Laws, K.R.
In the target paper, I outlined several
methodological issues associated with attempts to
document category specific deficits; and a potential
solution based around certain minimal criteria. The
main argument being that an accurate interpretation
of patient performance requires a comparison with
a normal control group and that the group performs
below ceiling. Neither of these requirements is new
or one would imagine, especially contentious. It is
therefore surprising that a review of the category
specific literature reveals no single study that meets
these criteria (Laws, in press). Moreover, this has
to be viewed in the context that the commonly
used analyses (within-patient χ2 and between-
subject comparisons with controls at ceiling)
produce false positive, false negative and even
paradoxical deficits.
The target paper commentaries may be roughly
classified into those on the one hand in favour of
using controls who are not at ceiling (Sartori and
Lombardi; McMullen and Filliter; Rosazza et al.,)
and that analyses of healthy controls are critical in
themselves (Låg; Marques), through to those who
feel that their data already meets the criteria in the
target paper (Capitani and Laiacona; Laiacona and
Barbarotto; Bright et al.,) or argue that controls are
not necessarily required (Marshall and Gurd’s
extreme cases approach). This reply will focus
primarily on general points of contention raised by
the contributors.
Solutions to the Ceiling Effect in Controls
Capitani and Laiacona discuss various possible
solutions to address ceiling effects in controls,
including: degrading the stimuli in some way to
make them more difficult for controls, using
controls who perform below ceiling (for example,
older subjects)i or constructing a more difficult
stimulus set.
Both Capitani and Laiacona and Marshall and
Gurd reject the stimulus degradation idea because
it would introduce unknown variables (see Låg) as
also remarked upon in the target article (see
comments on Turnbull and Laws, 2000). Although
stimulus degradation is a useful tool for examining
the factors affecting the category differences in
healthy subjects (Låg; Marques; Låg, in press;
Laws and Neve 1999; Laws et al., 2002; Laws,
2000), it cannot provide control baselines. This
becomes apparent when one considers that different
presentation conditions may interact with category
(see Låg, in press; Gerlach, 2001; Laws and Neve,
1999).
The solution preferred by Capitani and
Laiacona is a “slightly different” group of normal
subjects who in this case, consist of 60 elderly
subjects (30 males and 30 females aged 71). These
elderly subjects used in all of the studies by
Capitani, Laiacona and colleagues do however
have naming at ceiling with 91.83 ± 12.8% and
96.38 ± 7.33% of the controls naming all of the
living things and nonliving things correctlyii.
Like Capitani and Laiacona, Marshall and Gurd
have concerns about using ‘more difficult’ stimuli
because of possible ‘floor effects’ in patients and
because the stimuli might be “more subject to any
peculiar habits of the subjects”. Graded naming
tests, however, need not necessarily engender floor
effects; and for example, Laws et al. (in press)
reported picture naming for Alzheimer patients at
25% (not at floor), while controls performed at
75% (not at ceiling). Similarly, Rosazza et al.,
document a living deficit in their patient using a
variation on this approach. Concerning the point
about “peculiar habits”, it is of course, inevitable
that graded tests would more successfully tap and
reflect individual variability. Indeed, part of the
attempt to explain category effects should be
directed toward understanding normal individual
variability (rather than homogenous perfect
performance).
Normal Individual Variability
As noted by Marques, natural asymmetries of
category processing exist in healthy subjects and
so, control data are essential to “…even establish
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i Another unmentioned possibility might be to use pathological controls to
attain a below ceiling ‘control’. Such an approach may indicate
abnormality, but critically not the direction. This is exemplified by the
problems associated with double dissociations (see Figure 1) that are not
referenced to healthy control data.
ii More critically, while the regression method advocated by Capitani and
colleagues could potentially address some of the issues raised in the target
paper, it is not immune to ceiling effects. In the original article, I mistook
the term ‘Name Agreement’ used by Capitani , Laiacona and colleagues’
papers to mean what it typically means, i.e. the number of alternative
names produced rather than an indicator that control data were included in
the regression.
that a real deficit is present”. Therefore, as Sartori
and Lombardi remark, we cannot rely upon generic
control groups because category performance may
be affected by sex, education and age differences.
In the context of normal individual variability,
Laiacona and Barbarotto refer to several studies
documenting an interaction between sex and
category (e.g. Capitani et al., 1999; Barbarotto et
al., 2002; Laws, 1999, 2003) with males
performing better with nonliving things and
females with living thingsiii. Findings relating to
such individual differences are important both as
an aid to understanding category effects and in
determining the nature of appropriate controls i.e.
they indicate that controls should be sex matched. 
Illusions of Double Dissociations beyond Naming
An altogether different issue raised by Laiacona
and Barbarotto and by Bright et al. concerns the
emphasis on picture naming in the target article.
While picture naming does represent just one test
of category specificity, it was chosen for a variety
of reasons, including the fact that it is the one test
common to almost all studies and is used
(implicitly or otherwise) as the standard means to
documenting category effects. Of course, most
studies use many other tests; however, the choice
of any other single test is likely to be less
informative and less widely used (e.g. drawing,
naming-to-description, sentence verification). 
If one accepts the methodological problems
relating to controls in picture naming studies, it
would be unsurprising to see that the same problems
extend to other tests in the same studies (or even
beyond category specificity as alluded to by
Marshall and Gurd). Indeed, a cursory glance at
category specific studies (or the wider literature)
appears to confirm this suspicion. As an example,
let us examine the semantic question data for PL
and MF (Laiacona and Barbarotto)iv as a potential
double dissociation across living and nonliving
things. The absolute scores and the cross-over figure
do look convincing, and are typical of the evidence
presented for double dissociations (and ultimately
the fractionation of cognition). Nevertheless, the
normative data for this task come from the same 60
elderly individuals and is again at ceiling (96.7%
and 98.6% of subjects answered every living and
nonliving thing question correctly). Therefore, the
ceiling effect problem with naming also extends to
other tests in category specific investigations. At a
more abstract level, consider the typical double
dissociation in this area of enquiry (which is
unreferenced to controls) below and how the
interpretation might change when control data are
added. This example shows how absolute
performance may be misleading. An apparent and
typical double dissociation, when referenced to
controls, may reveal the same category deficit in
both patients (here for living things).
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iii Marshall and Gurd provide an example in which it seems John Marshall
knows nonliving things such as demijohn and tantalus, but not armadillo
and platypus. One possible explanation is the interaction between category
and sex.
iv Capitani and colleagues refer to several of their cases that “escaped my
attention” (re: Barbarotto et al., 1995 [MF]; Albanese et al., 2000 [GR and
PL]; Laiacona et al., 2003 [EA]). Three of these cases were actually
referenced in the target paper – each being reported on more than one
occasion elsewhere: PL (Laiacona and Capitani, 2001); GR (Laiacona et al.,
1993); EA (Barbarotto et al., 1996; Laiacona et al., 1997).
Fig. 1 – Category double dissociation or two single dissociations of the same category?
Legend. The figure on the left shows a typical double dissociation between living and nonliving things; however, these are
unreferenced to control data. The figure on the right shows an alternative possibility with fake control data added. Contrary to the
implication from the double dissociation on the left, this shows that both patient 1 and 2 are impaired for Living things and are normal
for Nonliving things. Of course, the control data could be drawn to provide the converse example.
Extreme Cases
Marshall and Gurd refer to the method of
‘extreme cases’, where patients, but not normal
subjects for example “…make semantic errors
when reading individual words…(or) draw
clockfaces that only include the numbers 12, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6”. These examples, however, are
dealing with qualitatively different human
behaviours. While in category specificity (and
many other neuropsychological deficits), the focus
is on quantitative differences and it is not known a
priori whether normal subjects would show a
living or nonliving advantage. In this sense, while
extreme cases may be useful, they are unusual and
in the minority of published neuropsychological
case studies.
If Normal Subjects show a Living Advantage, then
why are there so many Living Deficits?
Bright et al. suggest that some of the points I
raised in the target article are “ill-judged and
contradictory”. The focus of the argument by
Bright and colleagues appears to rest on two
assumptions that they take to be contradictory: (a)
the finding that normals show better naming of
living than nonliving things; and (b) the far greater
incidence of living deficits reported in patients.
Turning to the first assumption, if materials are
matched across category on the usual nuisance
variables, controls do show better naming of living
than nonliving things (see Laws, 1999, 2000,
2002a, 2003; Laws et al., 2002b; Laws and Neve,
1999)v. Despite the assumptions that some
researchers build into their models of category
specificity, I am not aware of any study of normal
subjects reporting a naming advantage for
nonliving things on matched stimulivi. The second
assumption is one that I have directly questioned
(Laws et al., in press; Laws, in press). Indeed,
Laws et al. (in press) have shown that over-reliance
on stimuli that engender ceiling effects in controls
may inflate the proportion of living cases and
underestimate the number of nonliving ones (Laws
et al., in press; Laws et al., 2003)vii. 
Bright et al. suggest that that I have been over-
dismissive of their data for JBR (Bunn et al., 1998)
and RC (Moss et al., 1998). In both cases, the
same control data were taken from a colour photo
set in 40 young controls and 8 elderly controls.
Contrary to what Bright et al. claim, both control
groups were at ceiling (living and nonliving things,
young controls score 93 vs. 96% correct; and for
the 8 elderly controls score 95 vs. 95% correct).
Finally, they refer to the contradictory findings
from the case of SE (originally described by Laws
et al. (1995), but later also described by Moss et
al., 1998; see also Laws, 1998). If a patient
produces contradictory results across groups, then
it does seem grounds for doubting the findings of
both studies and a warning about comparing across
different paradigms and materials (see also
commentary by Låg; see also Laws, 1998). Second,
and critically, they argue that they “…did meet all
of Laws’ criteria for comparison to control groups”
(my italics), but this is not the case. Three sets of
naming data are presented: the full Snodgrass and
Vanderwart corpus (using 12 controls) of stimuli
unmatched across category; a subset of those
stimuli matched for frequency and familiarity, but
with no controls; and the colour photos from Bunn
et al.; here used a within patient comparison and
no reference to controls. Hence, none of their data
meets the criteria outlined in the target article. 
Leaving aside Laws et al. (in press) and
Rosazza et al., which demonstrate the approach
advocated, and despite the claims made in some
commentaries, no study has documented a category
effect that meets the criteria outlined in the target
article. In other words, none have demonstrated a
category effect using: (a) a matched (sex, age etc)
control group who; (b) do not perform at ceiling
on; (c) stimuli that have the usual cross-category
confounding differences controlled; and (d) in
which the sample statistics are treated as statistics
rather than as population parametersviii. Moreover,
this means that, currently, no soundly established
double dissociation between living and nonliving
things exists. As noted in the target paper, this does
not mean that category effects do not exist. Indeed,
the approach outlined above represents a set of
minimal criteria that will enhance the accuracy of
their documentation and interpretation. While it
remains to be determined whether these control
problems apply more generally in cognitive
neuropsychology (pace Marshall and Gurd), they
do extend beyond picture naming and pervasively
affect category specific studies. 
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